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Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
IV. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. May the trial courts impose a default judgment 
when a party answers interrogatories 13 days late and the delay 
is excusable? 
2. Should certiorari be granted when the Court of 
Appeals uses immaterial and, heretofore, unrecognized factors 
in upholding the sanction of a default judgment for answering 
interrogatories 13 days late? 
3. Should certiorari be granted when the court of 
Appeals invents factors that do not factually exist in 
upholding a default judgment sanctions? 
V. 
REFERENCE TO THE OFFICIAL REPORT 
OF THE OPINION ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals is reported 
at Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 132 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 
(Ct. App. April 24, 1990). Hereinafter ("Schoney at .") (A 
copy of the opinion is attached as Exhibit 1 to the Appendix of 
this Petition.) 
VI. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The decision sought to be reviewed was entered on 
April 6, 1990. In subsequent orders dated May 3, 1990 and May 
16, 1990, this Court granted petitioners up through June 4, 
1990 in which to file a Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
Jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(a) and Rules 45-51 of the Utah Rules of the Appellate 
Procedure. 
VII. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND REGULATIONS 
The controlling provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure are 37(d) and 37(b)(2)(c). The text of the rules is 
set forth in Appendix, Exhibit 2. 
VIII. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Schoneys brought this class action alleging 
breach of contract, fraud, breach of trust and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress arising out of Memorial 
Estates' sale of mausoleum crypt space. The class was 
certified by Judge Fishier. Later, Judge Dee decertified the 
class. On the eve of a jury trial, Judge Moffat dismissed the 
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entire Complaint on summary judgment, and entered a default 
judgment as a sanction for answering interrogatories 13 days 
late. (Transcript of Proceedings, June 21, 1988 pp. 51, 52, 
hereinafter "Tr. p. .") 
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the default 
judgment, as a discovery sanction, and ruled it had no need to 
consider the propriety of the summary judgment entered by the 
trial court. 
IX. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES 
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. The Schoneys brought their claims individually 
and on behalf of the class of consumers of Memorial Estates 
Services. (R. 202, 294.) 
2. The Schoneys served interrogatories on Memorial 
Estates on June 17, 1982. (R. 12.) Memorial Estates answered 
the interrogatories twenty eight (28) days late. (R. 50.) 
3. The Schoneys submitted to Memorial Estates a 
request for documents on January 28, 1983. (R. 197.) Memorial 
Estates never responded to the request. 
4. The Schoneys served another request for 
documents on March 1, 1983. Memorial Estates never responded 
to the request. (R. ,225.) 
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5. Schoneys certified the case for trial „in May of 
1983 (R. 263.) Memorial Estates objected (R. 269.) The 
Schoneys again certified the case for trial on September 13, 
1983. (R. 390.) Because of District Judge Leary's, poor 
health, and to avoid delay, the Schoneys moved and obtained a 
different trial Judge. (R. 522.) The Schoneys certified the 
case as ready for trial on April 22, 1986. (R. 1067.) The 
Court entered a scheduling order setting the case for trial, as 
a first place setting on February 9, 1987. However, Judge Dee 
suddenly retired effective January 31, 1987. The Schoneys 
requested a pro-tempore judge to prevent delay of the trial. 
The request was denied. (R. 1084, 1085.) The case was set for 
trial on August 24, 1987. Upon Memorial Estates' request for a 
continuance, the trial date was postponed to December 7, 1987 
and a discovery cut-off date of December 1, 1987 was 
established by the trial court. 
6. In June of 1987, Schoneys served another set of 
interrogatories and another request for documents. Memorial 
Estates sought and received a 62 day extension (until 
September 15, 1987) to respond to discovery. (R. 1121.) 
Memorial Estates did not answer by September 11, 1987. 
Memorial Estates partially answered Schoneys' discovery on 
November 24, 1987. (R. 1166.) The Schoneys were forced to 
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bring a motion to compel answers on December 8, 1987. (R. 
1150.) 
7. Schoneys' Motion to Compel was partially granted 
by an order entered December 23, 1987. (R. 1187.) 
8. Upon Memorial Estates' request, the trial was 
postponed until February 1, 1988. (R. 1139.) 
9. Upon the Court's own motion, the trial was again 
continued. (R. 1301.) 
10. Upon Schoneys' request, the case was set for 
trial on July 6, 1988. (R. 1336, 1338, 1360.) 
11. Memorial Estates claims to have mailed a final 
set of interrogatories and requests for documents to Schoneys' 
counsel on April 29, 1988 (R. 1363), forty days before the 
discovery cut-off date set forth in a scheduling order. (Tr. 
p. 3.) Schoneys' counsel said he did not receive the 
discovery until the first week of June. (Tr. p. 5.) The 
court blamed the mix-up on the mail. (Tr. p. 7.) Memorial 
Estates acknowledged receiving unsigned answers to its 
discovery on June 15. (Tr. p. 4, In. 20, R. 1398.) Signed 
answers were served on June 20, 1988. (R. 1292.) 
12. Two Memorial Estates substantively identical 
summary judgment motions were denied. (R. 693, 1301.) 
Memorial Estates filed a third Motion for Summary Judgment and 
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Motion for Default Judgment on June 14, 1988. (R. 1363.) The 
motions were heard on June 21, 1988. (Transcript of 
Proceedings, June 21, 1988.) 
13. At the June 21 hearing, the Court admitted it 
had not read the file (Tr. p. 2.) Memorial Estates renewed 
its $4,000 offer of judgment. The court gave Schoneys' counsel 
the Hobson's choice of accepting the $4,000, or suffering the 
fate of a summary and default judgment. The $4,000 was 
rejected and the court granted Memorial Estates' Motions for 
Summary and Default Judgment. (Tr. pp. 51, 52.) 
14. The trial court: a) did not find that Schoneys' 
short delay in answering the interrogatories was willful; b) 
did not find when Schoneys' counsel received the interrog-
atories; c) did not examine the interrogatories to determine 
whether they were duplicitous of other discovery as alleged by 
Schoneys' counsel; and d) never entered an order compelling 
discovery. 
15. At the conclusion of the June 21 hearing, the 
court said: 
.1 think that the rules require, and 
that the Gardner case would require that 
the motion to strike [as a default 
sanction] be granted. 
(Tr. pp. 52, 53.) 
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16. On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed 
the default judgment and ruled that accordingly it had no need 
to consider the propriety of the summary judgment. Schoney v. 
Memorial Estates, Inc., 132 Adv. Rep. 22 (Ct. App. April 24, 
1990). 
X. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE THE COURT OF 
APPEALS HAS CHANGED THE STANDARD FROM "WILLFUL FAILURE 
TO ANSWER DISCOVERY" TO "EXCUSABLE NEGLECT" FOR 
IMPOSING DEFAULT JUDGMENT AS A DISCOVERY SANCTION 
A. Introduction. 
As set forth in Section IX, paragraphs 2-4 of this 
Petition, Memorial Estates repeatedly failed to timely respond 
to Schoney's discovery requests. Some of the requests have 
never been responded to by Memorial Estates. Other Memorial 
Estates' delays range from 28 to 132 days. However, when 
Schoneys answered Memorial Estates' last set of interrogatories 
(most of which were cumulative) 13 days late, the court entered 
a default judgment as a sanction against the Schoneys. 
B. Legal Analysis. 
The default judgment sanction was imposed even though 
there was not a finding of a willful refusal to answer. The 
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legal standard for striking a pleading as a discovery sanction 
is "a showing of willfulness, bad faith, or fault on the part 
of non-complying party. U.R.C.P. 37(b)(2)(c); First Federal 
Savings & Loan Association of Salt Lake City v. Schamack, 684 
P.2d 1257, 1266 (Utah 1984). In every appellate Utah Case that 
has considered the issue, the Utah Courts have unanimously and 
unequivocally required some showing of a willful failure to 
respond. Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 396 P.2d 410 (Utah 
1964); Carman v. Salvens, 546 P.2d 601 (Utah 1976); Arnica 
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah 1989). 
A review of federal decisions construing identical 
discovery rules shows that a default judgment is never entered 
.as a sanction unless: a) there is bad faith; or b) a willful 
failure to respond to the request; or c) a failure to respond 
to a court order to produce discovery. e.g., Local Union No. 
251 v. Town Line Sand and Gravel, Inc., 511 F.2d 1198 (1st Cir. 
1975); Edgar v. Slaughter, 548 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1977); Ohio 
v. Crofters, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 12 (D. Colo. 1977). Re Attorney 
General of United States, 596 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1979). 
In summary, Schoneys cannot find a case where a Utah 
or federal court has upheld a default judgment as a discovery 
sanction without a finding of bad faith or willful conduct. 
Neither could the Court of Appeals. 
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In this case, the trial court ruled that W.W. & W.B. 
Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734 (Utah 
1977) required the entry of a default judgment. 
• * • 
I think that the Gardner case would require 
that the motion to strike be granted. (Tr. 
51, 52.) 
The trial court's error is clear and complete. 
Gardner upheld a default judgment against a party whose defense 
was without merit and whose "persistent dilatory tactics 
frustrated the judicial process." Gardner, at 737. Gardner 
did not require a default judgment when there was no persistent 
dilatory conduct. Of course, no judicial deference is given 
the lower court when the lower court misapplies the law. e.g., 
Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778, 780 (Utah 1986). 
C. Factual Background. 
In this case, the trial court did not make a finding 
of wilful failure to answer because there was none. The 
relevant transcript shows: 
a) Memorial Estates claims to have served interrog-
atories on April 29th, 40 days before the 
discovery cut-off date. (Tr. p. 3.) 
b) Schon^ys' counsel did not receive the interrog-
atories. (Tr. p. 5.) 
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c) Schoneys' counsel was on vacation from June 3 to 
June 12. During the vacation, Memorial Estates' 
counsel called the office of Schoneys' counsel 
to see if there was a mix-up. Upon learning 
that Schoneys' counsel had not received the 
interrogatories, he sent over another copy. 
(Tr. p. 5, 6.) 
d) Schoneys' counsel returned from vacation on June 
12 and within 3 days submitted unsigned answers 
to Memorial Estates. Signed answers were send 
one week later. (Tr. p. 6, 3.) 
e) The court blamed the mix-up on the mail: 
It's a constant darn problem about mailing 
and at times, I, with lesser counsel, have 
some problems about veracity. It is 
really a problem with mailing. I don't 
know what we're going to do about it. . . . 
(Tr. p. 7.) 
Based on the foregoing, the court entered the default 
judgment of Schoneys as a sanction for answering interrog-
atories 13 days late. No comparable sanction was ever imposed 
on Memorial Estates for its much longer delays in responding to 
discovery. The decision was upheld by the Court of Appeals 
without citing a single case except for W.W. & W.B. Gardner. 
No other reported case on the planet has upheld a default 
judgment on comparable facts. 
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POINT II 
CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE THE COURT 
OF APPEALS USED IMMATERIAL AND HERETOFORE NEVER RECOGNIZED 
FACTORS IN UPHOLDING THE SANCTIONS OF A DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT FOR ANSWERING INTERROGATORIES 13 DAYS LATE 
The Court of Appeals listed several factors in 
upholding the trial court's default judgment sanction. A major 
factor in the Court's reasoning was that Schoneys had amended 
their complaint 5 times. (Slip opinion at p. 2.) 
Because of the complicated procedural history, the 
operative complaint was titled "Fifth Amended Complaint." 
However, the Court of Appeals was wrong to infer that 
plaintiffs had amended the complaint five times. In fact, the 
court had granted three motions to amend. 
Furthermore, the court was wrong to infer that there 
was something improper about multiple amendments. (Especially 
in a complex case.) One of the amendments was simply to 
clarify issues. (See Exhibit 3.) In at least one instance, 
plaintiff was required to amend simply because there had been a 
change in circumstances during the lengthy litigation. (See 
Exhibit 4.) 
It's true that the number of amended complaints may 
be a factor in deciding whether (1) allow a party to amend 
again. see generally, Merican, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor 
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Co., 596 F.Supp. 697 ' (E.D.P.A. 1984); or (2) to dismiss a 
complaint for failure to state a claim. Davis Stock Co. v. 
Hill, 2 Utah 2d 20, 268 P.2d 988 (Utah 1954); Letizia v. 
Prudential Bache Securities, Inc., 802 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir. 
1986). However, no court has ever used the number of amended 
complaints to decide whether a sanction of default judgment 
should be imposed for answering interrogatories 13 days late. 
POINT III 
CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE THE COURT OF 
APPEALS MANUFACTURED, OUT OF THIN AIR, FACTORS FOR 
SUPPORTING THE SANCTION OF A DEFAULT JUDGMENT FOR 
ANSWERING INTERROGATORIES 13 DAYS LATE 
One of the factors listed by the Court of Appeals 
were dealt with in Point II of this Argument. The remaining 
factors listed by the Court of Appeals were: 
a) That plaintiffs had "narrowly" escaped summary 
judgment. 
b) That plaintiffs were "in effect, living on 
borrowed time." 
c) That the court was "growing short on patience 
and determined to keep plaintiffs on a short 
tether." 
d) Schoneys were, ". . .somewhat uneven in dis-
charging their burden of prosecuting the case." 
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e) Schoneys' untimely compliance with the discovery 
requests necessarily compromised defendants' 
ability to have the information necessary to go 
to trial. 
f) Schoneys made it impossible for Memorial Estates 
to conduct follow-up discovery. 
g) Schoneys missed the discovery cut-off date by 4 
days. 
The first four reasons (a-d) are completely contrary 
to the Record. The trial judge acknowledged that Schoneys had 
vigorously prosecuted the case (see page 7 of this Petition). 
Further, of the six trial continuances granted, only one was 
made at the request of the Schoneys. See Point IV of this 
Argument. The musing of the Court of Appeals about "living on 
borrowed time," and "a short tether," and "narrowly escaping 
summary judgment" were spun out of thin air with absolutely no 
basis in the Record. Indeed, the Record is to the contrary. 
(See fact section above.) It was the defendants who were 
dragging their feet. 
Further, there is nothing in the Record that shows 
Memorial Estates did not have the information it needed to go 
to trial. In fact, Memorial Estates never made that claim. 
They only said that Gardner, supra required a default 
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judgment. (Tr. p. 5.) Schoneys, on the other hand, claimed 
that the interrogatories were, for the most part, duplicitous 
of previous discovery. (Tr. p. 6.) 
Finally, the earliest possible due date for the 
interrogatory answers was June 2. Schoneys answered on June 
14. Even if Schoneys had answered on June 2, Memorial Estates 
still could not have conducted further discovery because the 
discovery cut-off date was June 10. The rules allow a party 30 
days to respond to discovery. There were only 8 days between 
June 2 and June 10. 
It is axiomatic that the factual findings of a trial 
court must be supported by some evidence. e.g., Western 
Capitol & Securities, Inc. v. Knudviq, 768 P.2d 989 (Utah 
1989). The factual findings in an appellate opinion also must 
be supported by some evidence. c.f., Rule 30 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is because a factual ruling 
by an appellate court is binding on the lower courts. e.g., 
Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 361 F.Supp. 530 (N.D. 111. 
1973). In this case, there is nothing to support the factors 
listed above. 
It's true that Schoneys missed by 4 days the dis-
covery cut-off date set forth in the scheduling order. But 
the court and Memorial Estates also violated the scheduling 
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order by hearing dispositive motions less than 30 days before 
trial. (Tr. p. 7.) 
In summary, all of the factors listed by the Court of 
Appeals in upholding the discovery sanction of a default 
judgment are: 
a) immaterial and unrecognized by other courts; 
b) made up; or 
c) at best, inconsequential. 
POINT IV 
CERTIORARI IS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE THE COURT 
OF APPEALS HAS USURPED THE POWER OF THE TRIAL COURT 
It is axiomatic that the trial court has broad 
discretion in discovery matters. However, that discretion lies 
in the trial court - - not the Court of Appeals! It is the job 
of the trial court to exercise discretion. It is the job of 
the appellate court to review for abuse of discretion. 
This case turns that orderly judicial process on its 
head. The trial court judge exercised no discretion. The 
trial court judge merely concluded that: "• . .the Gardner case 
would require that the motion to strike be granted." (Tr. 52-
53.) The Court of Appeals then invented reasons to support the 
conclusion of the trial court. 
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The Opinion of the Court of Appeals .would be 
appropriate if it had been a memorandum decision of a trial 
court judge. If Judge Moffat (the trial court judge) had 
entered such a detailed memorandum decision, an appellate court 
could review. Here the trial court judge gave a bare 
conclusion. It was the Court of Appeals — and not the trial 
court — who exercised discretion. 
POINT V 
CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT 
AND THE COURT OF APPEALS HAVE DEPARTED FROM THE 
ACCEPTABLE AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 
The ruling of the trial court and the opinion of the 
Court of Appeals have clearly and completely departed from the 
acceptable and usual course of judicial proceedings. (See Rule 
46(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.) 
In particular, Judge Moffat didn't even read the 
file: 
.We have a Motion for Summary Judg-
ment. Haven't had a chance to look at the 
file. . . . 
(June 21, 1988 Transcript at p. 2, Lines 4-5.) 
Thus, Judge Moffat could not follow his duty to, 
". . .carefully scrutinize the submissions and contentions..." 
Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1976). Under lesser 
circumstances, federal courts have reversed summary judgments. 
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Reiser v. Coliseum Properties, Inc.f 614 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 
1980); Stepanischen v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Corp., 722 
F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1983). 
In the end, the trial court judge based his ruling on 
the case of W.W. & W.B. Gardner v. Park West Village, Inc., 
supra. However, since the trial judge had not read the file, 
he could not have read the case either. No copy of the case 
was handed to the judge at the hearing. Rather, the trial 
judge simply accepted the defendants' interpretation of the 
case. Thus, without even reading he case, the trial judge 
concluded: "I thing that the Gardner case would require that 
the motion to strike be granted." (Tr. 51-52.) 
During the course of the hearing, numerous fact 
issues were examined: viz. whether defendant's interrogatories 
were lost or delayed in the mail (June 21, 1988 Tr. p. 5, Lines 
18-25); whether Memorial Estates ever made a suggestion of 
death on the Record (June 21 Tr. at p. 11, Lines 17-20; p. 12, 
Lines 10-13); whether a $4,000 offer of judgment would satisfy 
all of Schoney's claims (June 21 Tr. at p. 14, Lines 7-11); 
whether Schoneys were shown a picture of the mausoleum before 
it was constructed (June 21 Tr. at p. 15, Lines 2-13); whether 
the Schoneys were shown a rendering of a mausoleum (June 21 Tr. 
at p. 16, Lines 20-25); whether the mausoleums at Mountain View 
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and Redwood Road were the same (June 21 Tr. at p. 17f .Lines 11-
15); whether the construction of a mausoleum at Redwood Road 
put the Schoneys on notice that a later mausoleum at Mountain 
View would be of the same quality (June 21 Tr. at p. 18, Lines 
6-10); whether a chapel has always been available at Mountain 
View (June 21 Tr. at p. 18, Line 22, p. 19f Line 5); whether it 
was reasonable for Schoneys to purchase alternate mausoleum 
space (at Sunset Lawn) (June 21 Tr. at p. 27); whether Memorial 
Estates sold more crypts than had been constructed (June 21 Tr. 
at p. 31,, Lines 1-4); whether the Schoneys purchased a 
mausoleum at Redwood Road or Mountain View (June 21 Tr. at p. 
36 and 37); whether Memorial Estates properly accounted for 
trust funds (June 21 Tr. at p. 43, Lines 8-22); whether 
Memorial Estates held a dead corpse as a hostage (June 21 Tr. 
at p. 46, Lines 1-9); whether Memorial Estates told Schoneys 
that their money would be held in trust (June 21 Tr. at p. 46, 
Lines 10-19); whether Memorial Estates represented that a 
mausoleum would be built when there were no plans to do so 
(June 21 Tr. at p. 47, Lines 1-7); whether it was reasonable 
for Memorial Estates to substitute an LDS chapel for the 
Schoneys, who were a non-LDS family (June 21 Tr. at p. 48, 
Lines 12-22); whether a chapel was available at both Mountain 
View and Redwood Road (June 21 Tr. at p. 51, Lines 1-3); 
18 
whether Memorial Estates was prejudiced because Schoney 
answered interrogatories approximately 13 days late. (June 21 
Tr. at p. 5, Lines 1-15.) 
In summary, it was clear error for Judge Moffat to 
grant summary judgment and a default judgment in such a 
complicated case, without even reading the file, the interrog-
atories, or the Gardner case. 
XI. 
CONCLUSION 
Certiorari should be granted when: 
a) The Court of Appeals decides a question in 
conflict with a decision of this Court; or 
b) The Court of Appeals decides an important 
question of law which should be settled by the Utah Supreme 
Court; or 
c) The Court of Appeals renders a decision which 
calls of this Court's power of supervision. 
The Court of Appeals, in this case, changed the 
standard for imposing a default judgment as a discovery 
sanction from willfulness to excusable neglect. The decision 
conflicts with prior decisions of this Court. Further, if the 
change in standard is going to be made, this Court should make 
it. 
19 
Finally, the Court of Appeals' use of immaterial or 
invented factors in upholding the default judgment. 
DATED this Y day of June, 1990. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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EXHIBIT 1 
F I L E D 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
George K. Schoney and Erma J. 
Schoney, et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Memorial Estates, Inc., et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
ARR^W990 
, Noontn 
C\Sfi\l\ *** Court 
Uteh C#urt rf Appeals 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 880630-CA 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Richard H. Moffat 
Attorneys: Daniel F. Bertch and Robert J. DeBry, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellants 
Earl Jay Peck and Stephen L. Henriod, Salt Lake City, 
for Respondents 
Before Judges Billings, Garff, and Orme. 
ORME, Judge: 
Plaintiffs, the Schoneys,1 appeal from the trial 
court's judgment in favor of defendant Memorial Estates. The 
judgment was based on two independent grounds: 1) Summary 
judgment on the merits and 2) default judgment for failure to 
respond timely to a discovery request. We affirm as to the 
default judgment and accordingly have no need to consider the 
propriety of the summary judgment. 
1. During the long course of this case, appellant George K. 
Schoney died. One issue on appeal is whether the trial court 
erred in dismissing the action as to him on the theory a 
suggestion of death was made on the record but no timely 
substitution of party was made. In view of our disposition of 
the case, we need not reach that issue. For convenience, in 
this opinion we will refer to plaintiffs in the plural. 
FIF F nnpv 
AVAILABILITY OF SANCTION 
The trial court entered default judgment against 
plaintiffs because they failed to comply with a discovery 
request within the time permitted by the rules and within the 
time provided by the court's order imposing a discovery 
cut-off. The entry of default judgment as a sanction based on 
failure to fulfill discovery obligations is within the 
discretion of the trial court. C. Wright and A. Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2291, at 812-13, 817 (1970). 
Management of the actions pending before it is uniquely the 
business of the trial court and while an appellate court may, 
of course, intervene if discretion is abused, we accord trial 
courts considerable latitude in this regard and considerable 
deference to their determinations concerning discovery. 
Rule 37(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a 
court to impose sanctions against a party for disregarding 
discovery obligations even when that party has not directly 
violated a court order specifically compelling discovery.2 
[Rule 37(d)] allows the court in which the 
action is pending, on motion, to impose a 
variety of sanctions on a party who . . . 
has failed to serve answers or objections 
to interrogatories submitted under Rule 33 
« . . . 
No court order is required to bring 
Rule 37(d) into play. It is enough that 
. . . a set of interrogatories . . . has 
been properly served on the party. 
C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2291, 
at 807 (1970). The possible sanctions the court may impose 
include those listed in paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of Utah R. 
Civ. P. 37(b)(2). Paragraph 37(b)(2) states: "[T]he court in 
which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to 
the failure [to fulfill discovery obligations] as are just, and 
among others the following: . . . (C) . . . rendering a 
judgment by default against the disobedient party." 
2. By contrast, Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b) authorizes discovery 
sanctions only where particular kinds of court orders have been 
violated. 
that everyone, including the court,3 shares some blame for 
this delay. Nonetheless, there was no counterclaim in this 
case, and the primary responsibility for moving the case along 
rested with plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were, at best, somewhat 
uneven in discharging their burden of prosecuting the case in a 
timely fashion during its five-year life at the trial 
level.4 
Third, the court itself had become involved in the 
discovery process, unqualifiedly indicating its desire to bring 
the lengthy proceedings to an end. The court had imposed an 
order fixing a cut-off date for discovery. While such an order 
is not on precisely the same footing as an order actually 
compelling discovery by a particular date, it is clearly 
analogous. 
Finally, the trial date set by the court was only a few 
weeks beyond the discovery cut-off date. Plaintiffs' untimely 
compliance with the discovery request necessarily compromised 
defendant's ability to have the information necessary to go 
forward with trial on the date set by the court.5 Moreover, 
the untimeliness of plaintiffs' answers effectively precluded 
3. Various proceedings in this case were heard by five 
different trial judges. The retirement of one judge 
effectively cost plaintiffs a prior trial setting. 
4. CJL. Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237, 241 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (Orme, J., concurring specially) (when case had been 
pending for almost ten years, length of time the action had 
been pending was a relevant consideration in court's sua sponte 
decision that case should be dismissed). 
5. Plaintiffs argue no prejudice actually resulted because 
the interrogatories sought information which was duplicative, 
extraneous, and unimportant. If this were true, a timely 
objection or motion for protective order would have been in 
order. Neither was made. We decline to consider this 
contention for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Zions 
First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co.. 749 P.2d 651, 
655 (Utah 1988). See also C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 2291, at 810-11 (1970) ("A party may 
not defend against sanctions under Rule 37(d) by contending 
that the request for discovery was improper or objectionable. 
If he takes this view, he is required to apply for a protective 
order under Rule 26(c)."). 
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EXHIBIT 2 
"Rule 37. Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanc-
tions. 
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon reasonable 
notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order 
compelling discovery as follows: 
(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to a party may be 
made to the court in which the action is pending, or, on matters relating 
to a deposition, to the court in the district where the deposition is being 
taken. An application for an order to a deponent who is not a party shall 
be made to the court in the district where the deposition is being taken. 
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or 
submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or other entity fails to 
make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer 
an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a 
request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that 
inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to permit inspection as 
requested, the discovering party may move for an order compelling an 
answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance 
with the request. When taking a deposition on oral examination, the 
proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the examination be-
fore he applies for an order. 
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part, it may make such 
protective order as it would have been empowered to make on a motion 
made pursuant to Rule 26(c). 
(3) Evasive or incomplete answer. For purposes of this subdivision 
an evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to answer. 
(4) Award of expenses of motion. If the motion is granted, the court 
shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose 
conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such 
conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable ex-
penses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the 
court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or 
that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, 
require the moving party or the attorney advising the motion or both of 
them to pay to the party or deponent who opposed the motion the reason-
able expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney fees, 
unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially 
justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
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If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may 
apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion 
among the parties and persons in a just manner. 
(b) Failure to comply with order. 
(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. If a 
deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after being directed to 
do so by the court in the district in which the deposition is being taken, 
the failure may be considered a contempt of that court. 
(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party or an 
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated 
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an 
order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under Sub-
division (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an order 
entered under Rule 26(f), the court in which the action is pending may 
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others 
the following: 
(A) an order that the matters regarding which the order was made 
or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the 
purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party ob-
taining the order; 
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or 
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from intro-
ducing designated matters in evidence; 
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying fur-
ther proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the action or 
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default 
against the disobedient party; 
(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an 
order treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders 
except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination; 
(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule 
35(a) requiring him to produce another for examination, such orders 
as are listed in Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, unless 
the party failing to comply shows that he is unable to produce such 
person for examination. 
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court 
shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising 
him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, 
caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substan-
tially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses 
unjust, 
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit the genuineness 
of any document or the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if 
the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the 
document or the truth of the matter, he may apply to the court for an order 
requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in 
making that proof, including reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall make 
the order unless it finds that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant 
to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance, or 
(3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that he might 
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>vail on the matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to 
mit. 
d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve answers to 
;errogatories or respond to request for inspection. If a party or an 
icer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under 
le 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before 
> officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper 
tice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under 
le 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written 
ponse to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper 
•vice of the request, the court in which the action is pending on motion may 
tke such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others it may 
:e any action authorized under Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision 
(2) of this rule. In lieu of any order or in addition thereto, the court shall 
luire the party failing to act or the attorney advising him or both to pay the 
isonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless 
> court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other cir-
nstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on the 
>und that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to 
> has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c). 
e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan. If a party 
his attorney fails to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery 
.n by agreement as is required by Rule 26(f), the court may, after opportu-
y for hearing, require such party or his attorney to pay to any other party 
\ reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure, 
nended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
EXHIBIT 3 
L uur i 
ROBERT J. DEBRY 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 8 4117 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE K. SCHONEY and ] 
ERMA J. SCHONEY, for 
themselves and all others ' 
similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MEMORIAL ESTATES, INC. and, \ 
MEMORIAL ESTATES CEMETERY ', 
DEVELOPMENT CORP., corpora-
tion and JOHN DOES 1 through 
10, individuals, 
Defendants 
1 MOTION TO 
I AMEND COMPLAINT 
(Judge David B. Dee) 
Civil No. C"82-4983 
COKES NOW the plaintiff, and moves pursuant to 
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that leave of 
court be granted to amend plaintiffs* Complaint as set forth 
in the attached, proposed Third Amended Complaint. 
The grounds for this motion are that allowance of 
the amendment is in the interest of justice. 
Specifically, plaintiffs seek to amend count five 
to more specifically plead unjust enrichment on the part of 
the defendants. 
Allowance of the amendment will not prejudice the 
defendants, nor delay the upcoming trial. 
DATED this 
day of 
19a£. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
By: Ub&J- /jA~* 7 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Motion to Amend Complaint, (George K. Schoney, et 
al vs. Memorial Estates, et al, Civil No. C-82-4983)/ was 
mailed this /& day of Si/^^t , 1984, by depositing same 
in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
Joseph L. Henriod 
David Swope 
NIELSON & SENIOR 
P.O. Box 11808 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
~~y?^J^r 
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EXHIBIT 4 
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0 84 9 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE K. SCHONEY and 
ERMA J. SCHONEY, for 
themselves and all others 
similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MEMORIAL ESTATES, INC. and 
MEMORIAL ESTATES CEMETERY 
DEVELOPMENT CORP., corpo-
ration and JOHN DOES 1 
through 10, individually, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff respectfully moves to file the Fourth 
Amended Complaint (a copy of which is filed herewith). 
The grounds for the motion are that defendants have 
only recently disclosed that the mausoleum space at issue 
in this case is finally (after 12 years) under construction. 
Furthermore, defendants have only recently completed another 
mausoleum at the Redwood location for other class members. 
FILE COPY 
MOTION TO AMEND 
Civil No. C82-4983 
(Judge David B. Dee) 
This late construction substantially changes many of the 
theories of liability and damages in the case. Furthermore, 
defendants are not prejudiced because there has been no 
discovery cutoff and no trial date has been set. 
DATED this 28th day of February, 1985. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
By: 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MOTION TO AMEND, was hand delivered this 28th 
day of February, 1985 to the following: 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
Joseph L. Henriod 
David Swope 
NIELSON & SENIOR 
P.O. Box 11808 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
